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NATO’S SELEC TIVE SEA BLINDNESS
Assessing the Alliance’s New Navies
Thomas-Durell Young

G

overnments of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) are guilty of inattention to, and sea blindness in, modernizing their
navies. While among “old” NATO navies this reality is understood and documented widely, the state of development and readiness of those navies considered
“new” receives considerably less attention.1 On examination, these new navies are
deficient in building integrated capabilities, ensuring common operating procedures, projecting battlespace awareness, and accomplishing interoperability in all
maritime combat domains.
This is because of a combination of three factors: the tyranny of Mackinder
esque geography; the legacies of the former communist countries that inform
how forces man, equip, and train for war; and Western governments’ inability
when proffering advice and assistance to understand fully the operational and
cultural contexts within which the new navies exist. To date, a focused analysis is
lacking, not only of the status of development of these navies, but, perhaps even
more importantly, of the common challenges they face as they modernize their
respective fleets. This lack of an across-the-board analysis is not necessarily obvious, given the disparities in size of these navies and their different geographic
locations—the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas, none of which are contiguous.
However, this lack of attention is no longer prudent in light of Russia’s seizure
of Crimea and its policy of challenging the post–Cold War international order.
Those states with shores on the Black and Baltic Seas now find themselves on the
front line with, or indeed adjacent to, an aggressive Russia. Arguably, because we
lack a clear conceptual framework, we are hindered in our full understanding
of those endogenous influences that continue to obstruct the modernization of
these postcommunist navies.
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This article builds a foundation of understanding that provides a clearer analysis of the many challenges facing new navies in their modernization efforts and
provides an explanation for these navies’ limited operational capabilities. More
importantly, it identifies those influences that are inhibiting them from adopting
the basic and relevant tenets of Western defense and naval concepts.2 This is not
to imply that these navies should adopt a Western, blue-water rationale; rather,
there is an overwhelming need for them more systematically to adopt Westernstyle mission command and combat readiness, as well as operational and tactical leadership—practices that support the development of reliable, lethal naval
capabilities to deter Russian revanchist activities. To achieve this objective, it is
necessary that they more closely align themselves with Western defense governance norms and adopt a stronger operational focus through more training and
exercises and, consequently, more sea time for their forces. Yet, as the author
argues elsewhere, communist concepts are quite difficult to eradicate even after
legacy kit is retired and replaced by Western weaponry.3 Thus, a clearer appreciation of the conceptual and institutional challenges faced by these navies, as well
as instances where they have been able to overcome them, is applicable within
central and eastern Europe and beyond.
In its examination of NATO’s new navies, the article addresses four core areas. First, the best means to assess these navies is through the small-navy school
of thought—notwithstanding the ostensibly large size of the Polish navy, if one
counts hulls. An examination of the characteristics of this typology provides
a clearer understanding of the inherent challenges and operational limitations
under which these navies must function. Second, on this foundation the article
describes and analyzes the communist-era legacy institutional and conceptual
impediments to reform and modernization. That the Baltic States’ navies were
created from scratch implies that Soviet naval legacies are modest at best; however, their larger national defense institutions, as in other legacy countries, continue to harbor atavistic inheritances in their concepts, assumptions, and, indeed,
institutional logic. Third, the article assesses these navies within the context of
a resurgent Russia, with its offensive capabilities in the Baltic and Black Seas,
along with the different challenges that exist in the Adriatic Sea. These challenges include the current underperforming state of their fleets, the lack of or
insufficiency of modernization plans, and the policies and planning assumptions
that are inhibiting them from achieving greater levels of operational capability.
Fourth, the article assesses the policies, planning assumptions, and programs that
Western nations and their navies have employed in assisting these new navies to
modernize and become more lethal, then identifies how such advice and assistance can improve.
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UNDERSTANDING SMALL NAVIES
The small-navy model provides the greatest explanatory power for assessing the
forces and policies of the navies in the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas. Although
the model was developed relatively recently, a modest body of useful literature
has emerged that addresses the characteristics and challenges facing small navies.
To give an appreciation of the challenges unique to small navies, Till notes that
a small navy is one with “limited means and aspirations.” He adds additional
limitations of small navies: “geographic range, function and capability, access
to high-grade technology, and reputation.”4 Likewise, Germond observes that
navies can be categorized using the criteria of their reach and projection capabilities.5 Lacking economies of scale (in terms of numbers of platforms), small
navies with limited numbers of hulls are likely to be disproportionally subject
to the realities of the iron laws of required refits, which could keep them from
conducting continuous and cost-effective operations at sea. This complicates operational planning and training, because their availability and readiness rates are
lower than those of larger navies. At the policy level, the fleets’ small sizes render
them vulnerable to budget cuts, and this further exacerbates their challenge of
maintaining operational readiness. In small organizations with correspondingly
modest personnel numbers, commanders must understand how to exploit limited opportunities for gaining professional experience at sea and in challenging
postings. Gaining experience and command at sea—essential to developing and
growing commanders—is complicated in smaller ships because they have limited
endurance and therefore spend less time at sea than larger, blue-water vessels.6
These generic small-navy realities complicate such services’ ability to produce
leaders who have the credibility to give advice at the national level on what naval
forces are capable of providing.7
Because small navies cannot achieve the economies of scale that midsize and
larger navies enjoy, officials must command these forces effectively to provide
maritime-defense capabilities. For successful recruitment and retention of sailors, small navies must implement effective personnel-management policies to
create a sustainable career structure that includes a healthy balance between ship
and shore postings.8 Adding to the personnel-management challenges, small
navies often must put self-reliant ships to sea—those that operate alone instead
of within integrated squadrons. Given these stark realities, small navies, depending on defense policy priorities, often rely on multinational cooperation, develop
niche capabilities, accept limited operational roles, and accept compromises in
designs and performance of their ships. With this background in mind, one can
appreciate better the realities that NATO’s new navies face. All the navies assessed
in this article can be considered small navies; however, there are moves afoot in
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Poland that could break the Polish navy out of this classification and expand its
reach and power projection by increasing the size and capabilities of the fleet.9
CONCEPTUAL IMPEDIMENTS TO REFORM
AND MODERNIZATION
The continued employment of legacy forces is a key impediment to small navies’
adoption of Western naval concepts. Their entire approach to naval architecture,
weapons, training, and even crew space is vastly different from that characteristic
of Western concepts.10 Yet it is not only maintaining legacy platforms that has
slowed the adoption of the Western approach to naval warfare. In these countries,
all armed forces are built on a family of military concepts that in the case of communist military doctrine were quite coherent and highly integrated.11
Addressing the issue of legacy communist concepts is a twofold problem. First,
in the rare instance where officials have attempted to retire legacy doctrine, its
supporting concepts have proved quite resilient. Second, to date, Western officials and knowledgeable analysts have not acknowledged that the principles’
continued use (conscious or otherwise) in an organization presents a major
impediment to adopting Western defense and military concepts.12 It is essential
to understand that communist and Western military and naval concepts are antithetical, and therefore incapable of coexistence in the same institution.
Because of their coherence, these legacy concepts remain entrenched firmly
in practice, in law, and even within organizational sociology. Furthermore, as
related to navies, these legacy practices have impeded the adoption of Western
defense and military concepts because the former were designed to ensure that
senior officers were not permitted to make independent decisions at the tactical
level. In Western navies, commanders expect their subordinates to use critical
thinking and their own initiative to solve problems, while in many legacy navies
commanders are expected only to execute orders and never to take the initiative.13 To a degree almost inconceivable to the Western mind, former communist
defense institutions not only undermined the ability of commanders to exercise
command but also centralized decision-making power in ministries of defense,
both of which all but ensured that the armed forces would struggle to grow commanders, in comparison with Western culture.14
While it is true that these legacy concepts continue to exist throughout central
and eastern Europe, their intensity varies among defense institutions and navies.
It is instructive to identify key legacy concepts that continue to influence governments. These include the following:15
1.	 Policy, as it is understood in the West, often is not accepted in the region
and many times is confused with politika (partisan politics). It is rare
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that a defense institution has been able to formulate even modest policy
frameworks to express government guidance and priorities and develop
plans to execute them. Where policy documents do exist, they typically
are meaningless because it is rarer still that priorities are expressed at
all, let alone their financial costs (neither short-term nor life-cycle).
The observation to political, defense, and military officials in the region
that in a democracy, policy is money is met all too often with a blank,
uncomprehending stare.
2.	 Highly centralized decision-making, often occurring well above the level
of chiefs of services and even chiefs of defense, is employed for even
the most mundane issues. This is the case particularly with financial
decision-making. The norm throughout the region is that most capability
providers—chiefs or commanders of services—do not possess their own
operations and maintenance budgets. As a result, collective training and
overall readiness remain underdeveloped by Western standards.
3.	 This centralized decision-making continues to dissuade leaders’ critical
thinking. One observable consequence of this practice is that staff work is
of low quality, voluminous, and turgid, and it rarely provides leaders with
the information necessary to make informed decisions.
4.	 In place of critical thinking, one finds an organizational instinct to rely
on the legacy of using the algorithmic approach to problem solving.
Quantification of what are subjective issues, such as day-to-day planning
and management, allows leaders to avoid individual responsibility
because the algorithm is always correct—after all, it is “scientific.”
5.	 Defense planning at the national level throughout the region (including
by the defense institutions of even such relatively advanced cases as
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic States) is underdeveloped at
best and a failure at worst. The region is awash with long-term defense
plans that are unrealistic, financially unassessed, and therefore not
feasible.16
6.	 Legacy platforms, systems, and weaponry do not include the Western
concept of force management as part of the design process, which further
weakens defense planning. The result is that force development as a
concept—which must be inexorably tied to force management—remains
underdeveloped throughout these armed forces.
7.	 Lastly, in this summary of remaining antithetical concepts, in central
and eastern Europe there is an odd absence of either a conceptual
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understanding of or linguistic cognate for capability. In some Slavic
languages this is defined as potential, which misses the fundamental
meaning of such a key concept of modern Western military planning
and operations. Thus, the concept that a platform is not an asset unless
its crew is fully trained, exercised, and provisioned is being recognized
only slowly. The lack of understanding of this key concept throughout
these defense institutions partly explains why commanders do not have
operations and maintenance budgets, and therefore cannot reliably
produce capabilities.
This summary of prevailing legacy concepts should give pause to Western
officials who have the task of cooperating with these defense institutions and
navies to introduce them to Western naval concepts. If Western officials fail to
assist small navies in changing their individual and collective conceptual “souls,”
those services will remain inhibited from integrating effectively into allied military structures. As will be demonstrated clearly, the sale or gift of platforms and
systems alone has not enabled these navies to adopt modern Western naval concepts, and arguably it cannot in the future.
NATO’S NEW NAVIES: CHALLENGES AND STATUSES
If divesting themselves of communist legacy defense and naval concepts were not
sufficiently difficult for NATO’s new navies, their leaderships face an additional
challenge: because they are all continental states, their governments universally
suffer from acute sea blindness.17 This all-but-universal continental focus, in
which armies predominate, can be observed in the continued practice of organizing the armed forces under general staffs, as opposed to transitioning them to
joint defense staff organizations. Indeed, it is not unusual to find only a few naval
liaison officers posted to these general staffs, rather than a staff manned from all
three services. Sea blindness is exacerbated further at the national level because
few ministries of defense possess institutional knowledge of naval affairs or understand the requirements for survival in the modern maritime battle space. Not
surprisingly, naval policy, or endorsed national concepts, hardly exists in either
written or publicly published form, let alone within the institutional cognizance
of defense institutions.
Further complicating naval planning is the stark reality that many of these
ministries of defense lack a methodology for financially assessing even generic
capability options.18 As a result, naval modernization plans do not receive adequate attention and therefore suffer financially. Modernization plans cannot be
developed properly, since in almost all these navies naval and fleet headquarters
are effectively one and the same. The net result can be found in the poor quality
or complete lack of staff work to support national defense planning. Similarly
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/4
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to their respective ministries of defense and general staffs, these navies do not
develop accurate costings to support force-development plans and they fail to
formulate priorities, which results in capability incoherence that is easily observable in many of these fleets (e.g., platforms absent weapon systems and modern
sensors).
Additional evidence of the centralization of decision-making in capitals is
that few commanders of navies are entrusted with operations and maintenance
budgets to enable them to train and exercise their fleets in any predictable and
rational fashion. Or, as in the case of the Latvian navy, the navy commander has
a budget but lacks authority over maintenance. Therefore, the commander is
forced to coordinate maintenance efforts with the ministry of defense, which is
time-consuming and results in lower readiness of the fleet. The net result of these
conditions has been ships and crews at sea for far fewer days than their older
NATO navy counterparts—which reinforces the Soviet concept that it is better to
be ready to go to sea rather than the prevailing Western norm of habitually being
at sea.19 In addition to limiting the navies’ ability to train crews, these practices
also preclude them from conducting the normal operations at sea that would
provide greater opportunities for closer cooperation with more-sophisticated
navies as a matter of course.
In comparison with new NATO armies, and perhaps even air forces, these
navies also have suffered from an unintended externality: they generally have
missed out on the assistance that the other services received during their deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, there is an unintended imbalance created
by how much attention and operational experience armies, particularly special
operations forces, have gained as opposed to their generally ignored navies.
Consequently, many officers and sailors missed out on the invaluable experience
of deploying and maintaining ships for long periods on distant multinational
operations.
This lack of hard operational experience particularly has prevented the development of senior naval leaders who have a deeper understanding of Western
naval concepts. This has been mitigated in part by the deployment of ships to
NATO standing maritime forces and participation in some operations nearer
to home (e.g., Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, the United Nations maritime
task force off the coast of Lebanon, and support for NATO air operations off
Libya). The centralization of resource management within ministries of defense
has starved these navies of the funding necessary for adequate sea time, thereby
further limiting habitual contacts with allied navies. This has stunted their institutional understanding of how they fit into larger allied formations and the
associated exercise and training planning. This is costly to the Western alliance,
because these navies’ self-limitation from intensive sea training means Western
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navies miss the opportunity to profit from their regional knowledge and technical expertise in fields such as mine countermeasures (MCM).
The assessment of these navies by region that follows will facilitate a deeper
understanding of the unique challenges they face.
Baltic Sea
All navies operating in the Baltic Sea face considerable physical challenges. The
sea is shallow (two hundred feet on average, which has earned it the nickname
in German of the “flooded meadows”), registers low salinity and visibility, and
experiences wide temperature variations.20 It is also quite busy, with some 2,500
ships under way at any one time.21 These factors combine to produce a complicated hydroacoustic environment for antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The Baltic
Sea also has the unique distinction of being home to between forty and fifty thousand sea mines still unaccounted for from the two world wars.22 From a Western
perspective, the Russian-controlled Kaliningrad Oblast located between Poland
and Lithuania has become highly militarized. It contains the S-400 surface-toair missile (SAM) system and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). According to
some sources, from this oblast Russia is capable of carrying out an antiaccess/
area-denial campaign in a conflict with NATO.23 Kacprzyk and Friis recommend
that, in light of these capabilities, in most scenarios between Russia and NATO
the Baltic and Nordic regions should be considered a common operational area,
given the likelihood of conflict escalation beyond either region.24
Poland. NATO’s new navies in the Baltic share a few similarities, but overall are
quite different. The missions of the Baltic States’ navies are focused primarily on
MCM, and to a lesser degree patrolling, while the Polish navy is in a class by itself.
On paper, to support its stated mission of defending territorial waters and the
country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Polish navy appears fairly modest
in terms of hulls compared with old NATO navies. It consists of two former USN
FFG-7 frigates, three operational (albeit aged) ex-Norwegian Type 207 submarines, one Kilo-class submarine, and many legacy warships and support ships. It
is in the process of commissioning a newly built offshore patrol vessel (MAKO
A100 class); it possesses SSMs, Link 11 on some of its vessels, and Link 16 secure
datalink systems at its maritime operations center (MOC) and maritime component command in Gdynia; and it plans to procure Link 16 for new maritime
platforms and helicopters.25 On closer examination, the Polish navy shares many
of the same weaknesses that plague all other navies addressed in this article, except that it has a larger fleet. Fundamentally, the government in Warsaw largely
has ignored the Polish navy, a situation the navy has not helped by keeping the
naval fleet headquarters in Gdynia, as opposed to the capital, where decisions
(particularly financial ones) are made. Poland’s FFG-7s are almost forty years old,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/4
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have deployed on only three occasions, and have never been modernized properly; efforts to build new warships in government-owned shipyards have been
plagued by long delays and cost overruns.26 A misguided 2013 reorganization of
the armed forces that closed service headquarters and replaced them with inspectorates undermined effective force management of the fleet and made modernization and operational planning even more challenging.27 A recent government
defense concept aims to reverse this decision and reestablish a fleet headquarters,
but it remains to be seen whether the redesigned commander of the navy will
possess an operations and maintenance budget.28
In terms of weapon systems, the Polish navy currently possesses and
fields a number of types of SSM and SAM systems, such as the Norwegianmanufactured Naval Strike Missile, RBS-15 Mk 2, and Harpoon SSMs, as well as
RIM-67 Standard systems. The navy has two missile unit squadrons armed with
Naval Strike Missiles supported by Link 11 and Link 16, based in Siemirowice.
That said, a senior Polish defense official admitted in 2016 that the missiles’ range
(two hundred kilometers) exceeds that of the current network of coastal radars,
which raises questions regarding the missiles’ general effectiveness, given that they
are new and digital.29 This point apropos a recognized maritime picture (RMP)
speaks to a problem common to all new navies: the lack of effective interministerial
cooperation—between government ministries. In Poland, the government has
yet to create an interministerial maritime operations center (IMOC) where one
national RMP can be produced and effective coordination can be done at the
expert level. The border guards’ radar picture currently does not feed into the
navy’s MOC in Gdynia, providing further evidence of the poor state of coordination. Finally, although they are of questionable use, the navy possesses a legacy
network of underwater sensors in the Gulf of Gdańsk.30
Poland’s current government has pledged to modernize the navy by spending
over four billion dollars by 2030.31 Yet without significant changes to the conceptual framework by which the navy is commanded and its finances are managed,
this ambitious modernization plan could fall short of reaching its full operational
potential.
The Baltic Navies. The Baltic States’ navies, although small and largely centered
on fulfilling MCM missions, are still sufficiently different to warrant a degree
of individual treatment. Estonia falls short in relation to other countries in the
region because it has conflicting jurisdictional authorities between the ministry
of defense and civilian law-enforcement agencies.32 As a result, development of
one of the most basic capabilities needed to effect maritime security—an RMP
to produce maritime situational awareness (MSA)—has been stalled for years
by bureaucratic disagreements over ministries’ respective institutional roles and
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missions. This infighting has inhibited the creation of what should be thought
of as a national asset. The current, outdated RMP was developed for peacetime
conditions and is controlled by the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB). The
problem with entrusting such a responsibility to a civilian ministry is identified
in an insightful study on Estonia’s maritime security requirements chaired by an
eminent Estonian expert in defense planning: “As a matter of agency policy, the
PBGB capabilities have been optimized for the lowest level of crisis escalation—
the level of nonkinetic reactions, and therefore there is a systemic gap between its
expected performance and the capabilities and performance required on higher
levels of crisis escalation.”33
The current system cannot cover the waters that fall under Estonia’s jurisdiction (both territorial waters and the EEZ) at all times, and the existing datacommunications link to the
[A] clearer appreciation of the conceptual and naval headquarters is unsuitable. Moreover, the PBGB’s
institutional challenges faced by these [new]
three rotary-wing aircraft
navies, as well as instances where they have
are insufficient for the size
been able to overcome them, is applicable
within central and eastern Europe and beyond. of the country and are not
configured to conduct naval
operations. Owing to the lack of a wartime-capable RMP to support targeting,
the report concludes that it is not possible to conduct the maritime defense of the
country or employ its current fleet of three MCM vessels effectively.34 Finally, that
such a study had to be commissioned, as opposed to being produced organically
as routine staff work, speaks to the mistake made in the 2014 reorganization of
the Estonian Defense Forces that closed the naval headquarters at Miinisadam,
thereby undermining the navy’s ability to operate in a modern maritime defense
environment.35
In keeping with many other legacy navies, the Estonian naval commander
also does not possess a budget. Despite the government’s decision to limit the
navy to conducting MCM missions and providing support to international operations, there are some discussions about expanding some of its capabilities.
Expansion efforts (e.g., procuring Link 11) could improve communications and
data exchange, or use the army’s existing FGM-148 Javelins in the coastal-defense
mission, although their modest range (2,500 to 4,700 meters, depending on the
variant) should be assessed as a limitation.36
The other two Baltic navies, those of Latvia and Lithuania, possess both MCM
vessels and purpose-built patrol craft.37 They are fortunate in that—as is the case
with Finland, Denmark, and Norway—their national maritime-surveillance
infrastructure falls under their respective defense institutions. 38 Thus, each
possesses an RMP in which the navy plays the leading role. Latvia’s coast guard
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/4

NWC_Summer2019Review.indb 22

10

5/2/19 11:35 AM

Young: NATO’s Selective Sea Blindness—Assessing the Alliance’s New Navie

YO U N G

23

falls under the navy, but inexplicably it purchased four Skrunda-class patrol
vessels that carry only light machine guns, although they do have missionmodular weapons potential. The Lithuanian navy possesses four ex–Danish navy
Flyvefisken-class patrol vessels, two of which possess variable-depth sonars that
enable them to conduct some ASW training. These are the most capable warships
in the Baltic States, as they possess modern combat-management systems and are
armed with 76 mm guns. Further, consideration is being given to fitting them
with ASW mortars or depth charges from regional sources to complement their
sonars.39 In principle, both navies also have dedicated minelaying capabilities
using ex-Norwegian Vidar-class minelayers, but whether they have mines in sufficient numbers and can execute fast minelaying tasks is unknown. Missing from
these navies are critical enablers and weapons: missiles, torpedoes, and Link 11 or
Link 16 (although the Lithuanian navy is investigating procurement of the latter).
Most disturbing is a seeming inability of these three Baltic States’ governments
to agree on something as simple and important as developing a common regional
RMP, and each apparently is on its way to developing its own unique intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.40 The fact that these countries
cannot yet exchange real-time radar or sensor data with Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), let alone among themselves, needs to be addressed at the
appropriate political level.
Potential in the Baltic. In light of this brief analysis of the new allied navies in
the Baltic, one could conclude that in their current configuration they bring few
useful lethal assets to the alliance; however, they possess well-developed, modern
ports (e.g., Gdańsk, Gdynia, Klaipeda, and Liepaja). The Polish navy has great
potential for modernization and has the critical mass (and successive governments’ commitment to spend money on defense) to develop a modest but balanced fleet that could make a significant contribution to NATO’s defense posture
of the region. Yet notwithstanding Poland’s ambitious modernization plans, it
is clear that the navy’s intellectual software needs to be thoroughly rebooted to
retire legacy concepts, assumptions, and institutional logic and replace them with
the Western approach to modern naval warfare. A justifiable fear is that even if
new Western kit is procured it will remain underused or, worse, unused, and constrained by legacy concepts similar to the embarrassing example of the Polish air
force F-16s that took almost ten years to be declared full operation capable.41 The
other navies of the Baltic States face different challenges, and they are confronted
with the problem of scale and financial penury. That said, given their geographic
proximity to Russia and maritime exposure, there is an urgent need to improve
their maritime-defense capabilities. As one Estonian naval officer averred in a
private discussion, while there is no question that the country’s navy is part of the
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NATO integrated command structure, the service does not feel it is a part of the
alliance’s force structure.42
Black Sea
Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea was already significant before its seizure of Crimea, but its occupation of and movement of key offensive assets to
Crimean military facilities further complicate NATO naval defense planning.43
One source argues that the deployment of antiship missile systems in Crimea
and on the coast of Krasnodar Krai enables the Russian armed forces to strike
surface targets on approximately one-third of the Black Sea.44 As Horrell argues,
well before Russia’s invasion of Crimea its 2020 state armaments program envisaged significant upgrades to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, to include six upgraded
Kilo-class submarines and six Admiral Grigorivich–class frigates. Allied naval
planners also must account for the operational limitations placed on the deployment of warships from outside the Black Sea, as stipulated by the 1936 Montreux
Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits.45
The Romanian and Bulgarian navies currently do not possess operational submarines, and both lack sufficient numbers of ASW maritime-patrol aircraft. The
situation is complicated further by the physical conditions of the Black Sea that
make conducting ASW challenging.46 Black Sea allies also face the reality that cooperation among themselves is meager at best. Bugajski and Doran paint a grim
political-military picture of the region from the perspective of Western interests:
“Currently, there is little regional integration and infrequent interaction among
NATO’s Black Sea states, and an absence of well-defined contingency plans in
case of a Russian military assault. Romania and Bulgaria conduct no bilateral naval exercises, possess no common surveillance or early warning capabilities, and
have no collective defense plan.”47 Finally, allied naval and defense planners must
factor in the unpredictability of Turkey’s position relative to Russian military actions under the current Justice and Development Party government.
Romania. Of the two new NATO navies in the Black Sea, the Romanian navy
has made some progress in redevelopment since the end of the Cold War. As
in all legacy navies under discussion, Soviet concepts and assumptions framed
its institutional thinking about how its ships would fight and the essential naval
engineering of Romania’s sizable fleet of ships. It has taken a number of years
for leadership to emerge that is not highly influenced by Soviet-imported legacy
concepts. Under communism, officers and sailors were narrowly trained and specialized, and the Western style of command was eschewed. There is no question
that Sanders is right to observe that restructuring and adopting Western concepts
and thinking were delayed in Romania by some ten years owing to successive
governments’ indifference (sea blindness) and the limited financial resources
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/4
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dedicated to the navy.48 Over the past two decades, intensive use of Western professional military education and the procurement of Western warships (two ex–
Royal Navy Type 22 frigates in 2004) have combined to push the organization
toward modernization and a growing conformance to Western concepts. However, the continued existence in the fleet of Soviet and indigenous Cold War–
designed warships, all of which are of limited use in modern naval warfare (its rivermonitor flotilla being a case in point), suggests a conceptually confused force. For
example, logistics remain more tied to legacy than to Western concepts, which
can only impede the readiness and effectiveness of the fleet.
While the procurement of two Type 22 frigates from Great Britain was seen
as a significant commitment by the Romanian government to modernizing the
navy, absent from the sale was
The small-navy model provides the greatest
the procurement of Western
explanatory power for assessing the forces and SSMs and SAMs, active shippolicies of the navies in the Baltic, Black, and defense systems, and modern
Adriatic Seas.
electronic-warfare systems.49
Recent efforts to procure
these capabilities faltered in 2017 because of insufficient funds.50 Consequently,
these ostensibly modern Western ships cannot be employed throughout the
Black Sea. Nevertheless, whereas the ships hardly can be thought of as having
reached full operational capability, they have had a positive effect on the Westernization of the navy. Delegation of command has been implemented, albeit slowly,
and ship staffs (which enabled collective decision-making) have been disbanded.
Acquisition of these more-modern ships has required an overhaul of the
professional military education and training system, which includes conducting
principal warfare officer / tactical action officer training in-country, and, since
2008, implementing NATO’s Guidance for Operational Planning (subsequently
replaced by the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive).51 That said, the
lack of decentralized decision-making continues to pose a challenge. At the highest levels, it is troubling that many organizations of the navy possess their own
budgets (e.g., logistics, facilities, reconnaissance, and surveillance), but the fleet
commander does not. It is almost as if there is a belief that these other activities
are ongoing and therefore must be funded, but the fighting element of the service
is expendable. Rather, the Romanian defense institution employs the practice
common in the region (which is the result of legacy assumptions) of funding
only a major operation, rather than recognizing the essential need for a naval
commander to own an operations and maintenance budget if he is to achieve
any reasonable degree of readiness. Because of this, the Type 22s are chronically
underfunded and can meet only half of their annual required days at sea.
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In 2016, the Romanian government announced an ambitious modernization program to modernize the Type 22 frigates. This is commendable—except
for the fact that the ships are dated and the envisaged modernization budget is
unlikely to cover all the necessary repairs and upgrades, to include weapons.52
The existing Tetal corvettes are to be retired and, if funded, four modern, multirole Sigma-class corvettes will be built in-country.53 The navy has Link 11 and
is expected to procure Link 16, as well as satellite communications. And while
the navy lacks modern fixed submarine sensors, it claims to have surface and
maritime air pictures.
The modernization plans are indeed ambitious, and bringing them to fruition
is essential for the navy to overcome what one Romanian expert claims is a key
limitation: the navy currently can undertake only surveillance and constabulary
missions in the Black Sea, as well as support for international operations.54 Declaring 2018 to be year of the navy, the minister for national defense announced
the ambitious plan to procure three submarines and four surface warships for
delivery to the fleet between 2018 and 2024, which would improve its current
capabilities greatly.55 As an optimistic observation, the Romanian navy intelligently moved its naval headquarters to Bucharest in 2003 to be close to the locus
of defense budget and political decision-making. This sage move to the capital
has yet to be followed by any other European postcommunist navy.
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian navy, like other communist navies, emerged from the
Cold War oversize and in search of missions. While other countries underwent
periodic efforts to modernize and embrace Western defense and military concepts, domestic political disagreements in Bulgaria over the future of the military
left the armed forces, and the navy in particular, bereft of guidance by which to
reform themselves. A consequence of this strategy deficit was that well into the
late 1990s the navy found itself too large in relation to its tasks and still dependent
on legacy concepts; even today the navy possesses a large number of ex-Soviet
warships and auxiliary vessels.
Modernization began late in 2005 when the navy took delivery of its first
Wielingen-class ex-Belgian frigate, followed by a second in 2008, while a third
was procured in 2009 to provide spare parts. This procurement from the Belgian
Marine Component included a Tripartite mine hunter.56 On paper the frigates
possess Western missiles (i.e., RIM-7 Sea Sparrow SAMs and MM-38 Exocet
SSMs)—a rarity in these new navies. However, these weapons cannot be tested
very often, because the ships spend limited time at sea—despite deploying annually to Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, these ships get less than half the
amount of time at sea that is considered the norm for ships of their class. Moreover, while the navy possesses Link 11, it does not have Link 16, which limits the
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utility of its two Eurocopter AS 565 Panther helicopters (with a third to be procured in 2020). The navy possesses a MOC in Varna; procured some new coastalsurveillance radars in 2012; and is upgrading legacy analog systems, with U.S. assistance. Bulgaria still lacks an IMOC, as well as feeds from civil ministries’ radars
and sensors, thereby inhibiting a more comprehensive MSA. Bulgaria plans to
procure capabilities for secure communications with MARCOM by 2020.
As is so often the case in postcommunist governments, legacy procurement
concepts typically focus on platforms and ignore essential items such as training,
consumables, and a budget process steered by commanders so as to create naval
force capabilities.57 This has affected directly the ability of the navy to create and
maintain a semblance of readiness. An example of the perilous state of the navy
occurred in spring 2011 when the minister of defense directed the deployment of
the high-readiness frigate to support allied operations off Libya. Because of the
lack of funding within the navy, it took two weeks to deploy this single vessel.58
The inability of the ministry of defense to define its development plans financially has stalled planning throughout the armed forces.59 This lack of effective
planning, combined with the international financial crisis, resulted in 2009 in the
cancelation of naval modernization plans because the government was forced to
abandon the procurement of four French Gowind-class corvettes. A plan to resurrect this needed procurement so that superannuated Soviet ships could be retired
was canceled again in 2017.60 Current modernization plans envisage the procurement of two corvettes.61 This assessment of the Bulgarian navy demonstrates that
the fleet is aging and lacks sufficient funding priorities that would cover essential
training. As Sanders observes, this situation is unlikely to improve in the medium
term, given the past performance of the defense institution.62
A Tricky Balance. The existing balance of power in the Black Sea, therefore, is far
from being in the West’s favor. Efforts to modernize the Romanian and Bulgarian
fleets have fallen short of creating and maintaining necessary operational capabilities to match the challenges that Russia’s military buildup poses.
In light of this assessment, it is difficult to accept Sanders’s view that following
the Membership Action Plan leading to NATO accession “led to more focused,
systematic and effective military reform in both states.”63 The fact that both navies remain conceptually split between legacy and Western naval concepts speaks
to the continued presence of residual influences. For example, it is problematic
that the practice of keeping in service aged legacy platforms (e.g., river flotilla
vessels) can provide utility in modern naval warfare.
But it is the political dynamics in the region that are most challenging for
the alliance. These dynamics include a politically unpredictable Turkey, as well
as a Bulgarian policy that turned down the establishment of a NATO Black Sea
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fleet—advocated by a former Romanian minister of defense—on the grounds that
Bulgaria did not want to irritate Russia, to which many Bulgarians are favorably
disposed.64 Thus, unfavorable geography, owing to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and
political discord among NATO nations, leaves the Romanian navy exposed and
in need of strong allied support and modernization. Without doubt, the alliance
needs to continue the policy initiated after the Russian annexation of Crimea:
enter the Black Sea more frequently and take advantage of deploying existing advanced capabilities conveniently not addressed under the terms of the Montreux
Convention (e.g., maritime patrol aircraft do not fall under the treaty).65
Adriatic Sea
In comparison with the Black and Baltic Seas, the Adriatic Sea, strategically
speaking, is all but a backwater. The littoral states are members of the alliance
and maritime security priorities are dominated by navies and coast guards whose
missions are limited to supporting civil authorities in border control, antismuggling, and other law-enforcement tasks. Not one of them possesses any variant of
the Link tactical digital information system, nor do they have the active sonars
that would enable them to undertake ASW operations. With the exception of Albania, all other littoral navies have the former Yugoslavian navy’s (Jugoslavenska
Ratna Mornarica, known as JRM from its Yugoslav abbreviation) legacy concepts
and platforms of varying intensities.
Overall, the Adriatic is a benign maritime environment, but one that sees
heavy traffic (some forty thousand vessels per year). The countries on its eastern seaboard suffer from entrenched legacy civil institutions with conflicting
responsibilities and authorities over maritime security. With the exception of the
Croatian navy, limited defense budgets have produced only modest naval forces.
Since the navies of Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania exist primarily to render
support to civil authorities, the following discussion addresses them together so
as to provide an understanding of their common challenges, whereas, given the
Croatian navy’s size and the scope of its government’s maritime ambition, it is
addressed separately.
Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania. It would be easy to dismiss the relevance of
the navies of Slovenia, Montenegro, and Albania, given their small fleets, their
limited numbers of hulls and limited capabilities, and the priority they give to
supporting civil tasks. However, although these services are small and their capabilities limited, strong arguments can be made that they can support missions to
counter negative effects on political and social stability as well as to control illegal
immigration.66 They have been structured to provide surveillance, patrolling, and
interdiction missions on their limited budgets.
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The Slovenian armed forces’ ship Triglav 11 likely represents the most modern and capable vessel of the three navies.67 Montenegro has struggled to find a
way to put ships to sea that are not too old or expensive to operate (e.g., ex-JRM
Kotor-class frigates) and has opted to repair two aged ex-JRM Končar-class missile boats.68 Largely because of limited resources, Albania placed the coast guard
within the navy and embraced the concept of one navy with two missions, but
proceeded to procure four Damen Stan Patrol 4207–class patrol boats, which
were unarmed.69 The explaThe continued employment of legacy forces is nation for the anomalous
a key impediment to small navies’ adoption of procurement is that they
Western naval concepts. Their entire approach were financed partially by
the Netherlands Ministry of
to naval architecture, weapons, training, and
Foreign Affairs, which meant
even crew space is vastly different. . . .
[C]ommunist and Western military and naval the funds could not be used
to purchase military items.70
concepts are antithetical, and therefore incaThat being the case, armpable of coexistence in the same institution.
ing the ships with 20 mm
automated naval guns on the main decks has been delayed until the warranty
expiration of the last ship—a period of almost ten years. But despite this limitation, these boats have been deployed (unarmed) in support of Standing NATO
Maritime Group 2 in the Aegean Sea.
In addition to procuring vessels that meet mission requirements yet are affordable to operate, the other key challenge with which they have struggled is
the creation of effective interministerial coordination arrangements within their
respective governments. In this particular context, an effective arrangement is
defined as one in which those agencies that possess the capabilities needed to
carry out their respective roles and missions lead in those tasks. The depth of this
challenge can be found in the difficulties involved in something as basic as creating and maintaining an RMP that meets the requirements of national defense and
law enforcement. It was not until 2003 that the Slovenian government recognized
the need for such a standing, coordinated, interministerial body that addressed
both national and operation-level issues.71
Albania and Croatia adopted the Norwegian model of creating an IMOC on
the basis of the functional division of responsibilities among ministries. Albanian legislation, though, had the unintended consequence of placing the cost
of the coast guard missions on the navy but also removing the service from the
armed forces’ chain of command. Moreover, IMOCs, by themselves and with a
standing MOC, cannot maintain secure communications with MARCOM and
exchange classified data. The Montenegrin navy created a MOC and coordinated
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with civilian agencies through an interministerial working group. When required, representatives from civilian ministries augment MOC staff in the port
of Bar. Effective interministerial coordination and the creation of an RMP have
been essential for these navies to contribute effectively to the Italian-sponsored
Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center and produce a common virtual maritime awareness picture using information provided by member states and then
shared with Allied Maritime Command in Naples, Italy.72
Croatia. Finally, the Croatian navy is the only postcommunist navy in the region
with a fleet that is approaching being balanced. This is logical given Croatia’s almost two-thousand-kilometer coastline and its possession of over one thousand
islands, inlets, and reefs. Unique among neighboring navies, the service also possesses some offensive capabilities (i.e., missiles) and JRM-era mines.73 The navy is
considering acquiring Link 11, and the fleet consists of a mixture of ex-JRM missile craft (of the Končar and Kralj classes), patrol boats (of the Mirna class), and
two ex–Finnish navy Helsinki-class missile boats, which possess active sonars.
Significantly, the navy fields the Swedish RBS-15 Mk 1 SSM system at sea and
ashore, slated for replacement in 2024. The fleet includes one minesweeping vessel and various logistic-support ships, and it has plans to procure MCM vessels.
Additionally, the navy is defining the requirement for new offshore patrol vessels
to enter the fleet around 2024. A key operational limitation for the Croatian navy
is that despite the country’s extensive coastline and territorial seas, the navy lacks
a dedicated firing range.
As in the other former Yugoslav republics, for Croatia the acquisition of an
effective RMP has proved to be challenging, owing to overlaps in responsibilities
among the Croatian navy and civil ministries and agencies. The navy’s MOC receives radar feeds from civilian ministries and agencies, but they are not integrated into a common picture; creating a national MOC with one RMP is needed.74
Independently, it maintains an extensive coastal radar system, with nine radar
sites, which include four AN/FPS-117 three-dimensional, nine GEM elettronica,
and four Enhanced Peregrine radars, and other sensors. The AN/FPS-117 radars
are suboptimal for surface surveillance and are slated to be replaced with twodimensional systems.
The Croatian navy’s obvious challenge is its lack of financial means. Note
that the replacements for the RBS-15 SSMs and the offshore patrol vessel are to
be acquired in the same period. Resource planning likely will be strained by the
recent re-creation of the navy’s maritime infantry battalion, the need to replace
the AN/FPS-117 radars, and the pending acquisition of MCM vessels. Croatia is
unarguably a maritime nation, yet the navy receives, on average, only 6 percent
of the defense budget. In light of these realities, it is clear that the government in
Zagreb suffers from its own form of maritime myopia.
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Challenges Ahead. These navies are modest at best and face considerable internal, bureaucratic obstacles to creating nationally, let alone collectively, common
RMPs. Moreover, notwithstanding the offensive capabilities of the Croatian navy,
key capabilities such as ASW and even the ability to target (i.e., via Link 11) are
not currently in their inventories.
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss them. With Montenegro’s accession
to the alliance in 2017, the Adriatic is now effectively a NATO lake. That being
the case, modest levels of relevant Western advice and assistance programs, particularly focused on fixing political barriers to creating RMPs, are long overdue.
In the end, the alliance should consider its policies a success if these regional
navies are capable of undertaking peacetime surveillance, reconnaissance, and
response tasks, thereby allowing the more capable Italian and Hellenic navies to
carry out blue-water operations in support of Western objectives farther afield,
augmented with these fleets’ specialized capabilities.
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN ADVICE
AND ASSISTANCE POLICIES
A cursory review of NATO’s new navies demonstrates that they are burdened
with old platforms, sensors, and weapons (or a lack of platforms, sensors, and
weapons) and that they are bereft of adequate training concepts, funding, and in
some cases experienced senior leadership that understands the need to be at sea
rather than only preparing to go to sea. An explanation for the dismal state of
capability and readiness of these navies can be found in the lack of policy attention their own national leaderships pay them. Thus, it should not be surprising
that these navies long have lacked a strong operational focus and their readiness
suffers accordingly.
A frustrating legacy concept that continues to be practiced among these governments is that not all navy commanders are entrusted with operations and
maintenance budgets. Therefore, readiness often is seen solely as a function of
a discrete operation and is financed on an ad hoc basis, rather than being seen
as the lifeblood of any navy. The result is that essential training is funded fully
only when the navy is supporting an operation, such as participating in one of
the alliance’s standing NATO maritime groups. Yet new navies have to use these
deployments as opportunities for gaining needed sea days and developing basic
skills, as opposed to using them to achieve world-class standards. The evidence
suggests that few, if any, of these navies are able to put to sea annually for a number of days adequate to achieve levels of readiness and operational effectiveness
comparable to those of old NATO navies.
It is past time to retire these legacy concepts in a coherent fashion. Yet blame
for the state of underdevelopment of these navies needs to be shared.
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Twenty-five years of providing Western advice and assistance and their dismal
return on investment should demonstrate to officials that shaking off communist
legacy concepts is difficult. As Keynes presciently observed, “The difficulty lies
not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones, which ramify,
for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.”75
The difficulty of changing concepts should prompt Western officials to question
their policies and assumptions, as they have been ineffectual thus far in generating needed change in these
If divesting themselves of communist legacy
navies. The long-standing
defense and naval concepts were not sufficiently Western assistance policy
difficult for NATO’s new navies, their leaderrests on the assumption that
ships face an additional challenge: because they the challenges facing these
are all continental states, their governments
navies are largely technical
universally suffer from acute sea blindness.
and can be addressed using
focused training at the tactical
level. Missing has been any official awareness that such approaches will only treat
symptoms, not address causation in a coherent manner.76
As for the new navies’ governments, they must make the hard choices to cut
ties to as many legacy concepts as possible. Communist military equipment
was designed to support legacy-defined military doctrine, and it is problematic
whether any of these aged legacy platforms and systems could produce lethality
in the modern maritime battle space. Retiring legacy platforms, their systems,
and accompanying concepts as soon as possible would free up needed funds for
modernization and experimentation.
Officials need to recognize that taking the first step on the road to reform
is inherently a political matter and therefore must be addressed as a political
problem. This is an important point; acceptance of it leads to the conclusion that
responsibility for reform cannot be entrusted to armed forces and ministries of
defense alone, but rather must reside with the heads of government in all NATO
nations’ capitals.
The need for political solutions can be seen in the struggle of the new Adriatic
and Estonian navies to resolve jurisdictional disputes over institutional roles and
missions to create RMPs. The inability of these navies to clarify institutional roles
and missions with other ministries is not just an internal political issue but rather
has serious consequences for wider Western interests. Bureaucratic discord has
led to suboptimal capabilities that cannot produce an RMP that supports MSA,
which in turn prevents the services in question from being able to respond effectively and quickly to events at sea.
In short, NATO and Western governments have been suffering from their own
case of sea blindness when it comes to understanding the real challenges these
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navies have faced. As a representative example, Hoffman makes the prescient
observation that, with regard to the U.S. government’s European Reassurance
Initiative, almost none of the eight hundred million dollars appropriated in fiscal
year (FY) 2016 nor any part of a budget request in FY17 of $3.42 billion has been
allocated to the U.S. Navy to support NATO’s new navies.77 This lack of attention
by the Department of the Navy is surprising, given that one of its key strategy
documents has cooperative strategy in its title and the Navy’s support of these
activities is identified throughout the document.78
In light of the challenging security environment in the Baltic and Black Seas
and given the state of underdevelopment of the alliance’s new navies, immediate
action at the political level of the alliance and its member nations is long overdue.
Previous Western assistance policies and programs have been ineffective. Equally,
governments in central and eastern Europe have not supported consistently the
need to modernize their navies. A refocus of efforts toward reform should be
based on the principle, identified by Ullman, of fast-tracking experimentation
in the Black Sea to develop new and innovative solutions for deterring Russian
adventurism in either the Baltic or Black Sea.79 The challenges to this initiative
are numerous, but they can be overcome with strong support and pressure from
governments.
From the perspective of the new navies, the legacy concept—of focusing on
maintaining platforms at all costs while deprecating the overwhelming importance in warfare of creating effects—needs to be fully retired and its Western
counterpart implemented. As they experiment with new technologies, these
navies need to focus on innovation, with the full support and cooperation of
their allies.80 The alliance should focus on countering Russian offensive threats
in the Baltic and Black Seas and should experiment with drones, new sensors
and networks, ISR, cyber capabilities, nontraditional platforms, and targeting,
all of which should take place across air, sea, and land domains. Whatever capabilities are developed need to be hardened against Russian aggressive use of
the electromagnetic spectrum, and to the greatest extent possible tasks and costs
should be rationalized across member states. In the case of the Baltic navies, old
and relatively inexpensive solutions that could reinforce deterrence include acquiring a reliable fast-mining capability and employing nontraditional delivery
means.81 The Adriatic navies should not be left out of this effort; the fleets should
be encouraged to use their technical expertise to support these initiatives, given
that some of them (e.g., sensors and cyber capabilities) could be relevant to the
environment.
Maintaining the delicate balance among all these priorities—including, as
noted, innovation, joint/combined experimentation, and increasing operations—
will pose a significant challenge to these navies and their allies. However, this is
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where close political oversight by, if not continuous pressure from, alliance governments is essential. Faced with a political mandate to undertake these priorities, all these navies can find efficiencies to free up necessary funding. After all,
while the proposal to refocus one of NATO’s two standing maritime groups onto
high-end naval warfare has great merit, unless the alliance’s new navies become
more operational and more capable of making national contributions they may
end up as nothing more than missed opportunities.82
This article has marshaled extensive fieldwork and a deep review of the literature
to argue that national governments and key long-standing NATO members have
overlooked NATO’s new navies. Indeed, in most cases these navies have been
more starved of capital redevelopment and operations and maintenance funding
than their respective armies and air forces, in addition to receiving less and lesseffective Western advice and assistance. The old Viennese saying that “the situation is desperate but not serious” is not true—the situation is both serious and
desperate—and this applies directly to the need for all NATO nations and navies
to pay close attention to this issue.
The governments of the new navies must move in the short term to reconceptualize the use and management of their navies. Perhaps controversially, this
policy redefinition should precede a commitment of funds to recapitalize their
navies so as to ensure that money is not wasted unwittingly supporting legacy
concepts and platforms. With Russian provocations occurring frequently at sea,
these governments must change their defense policies and priorities to improve
their ability to contribute to their maritime security as soon as possible. The importance of naval forces must be reassessed and reinforced to ensure that these
navies can and do contribute to their countries’ maritime defense to the greatest
degree possible. If for no other reason, failure to do so runs the risk of ending up
completely outsourcing this key mission to allied navies, thereby opening governments to the accusation of undermining continuity of national sovereignty.
In addition to the navies themselves, almost all of their headquarters are
located on the coasts, and often distant, physically and mentally, from their
capitals. Organizationally and institutionally, they have been relegated to being
mere tactical appendages to the rest of their countries’ armed forces, thereby
denying government officials a full appreciation of the reality of modern naval
warfare and the imminence of Russian maritime threats. To improve oversight
and management of these navies, their governments should insist that if naval
headquarters are not located in capitals already they should move there as soon as
possible. This would provide these governments with the necessary opportunities
to reorganize army-dominant general staffs and create integrated defense headquarters. This would provide governments with better instruments of military
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power, as well as enable naval staffs to compete more effectively for funding and
political attention.
Both old and new NATO members need to respond urgently to the need to
transform these navies. Whereas this article has argued that a restatement of
priorities for governments in the region is needed, Western governments also
need to perform such a review. Fundamentally, Western governments need to
change their languid approach to their advice and assistance programs to provide improved aid to the new navies as they modernize and otherwise transform
themselves. The necessary assessment of the capabilities of the new navies should
leave no one in doubt that the previous approaches to providing advice and assistance simply have not produced sufficient returns on investment. The comfortable approach—of defining reform as a technical challenge that can be addressed
with training or by the piecemeal transfer or sale of platforms and systems—has
created instead institutional, and therefore capability, incoherence.
These navies are no longer legacy services, but neither are they fully Western.
While the traditional advice and assistance policies and programs have their
place, by themselves they cannot produce the necessary institutional change.
New policies—starting from a tabula rasa—should focus primarily on how to
help these navies retire legacy concepts and replace them with their Western
counterparts, with the objective of helping them to meet their unique maritimesecurity requirements. This review and replacement process requires that a broad
policy framework be adopted across allied nations and their navies, one that
drives experimentation within the maritime environment to produce cuttingedge, even nontraditional, but predictable, lethality at sea. In the end, it is predictable lethality and a political willingness to use it to defend vital interests that produce what the alliance desperately needs in the Baltic and Black Seas: deterrence.
Allied nations must not tarry; the West essentially has lost twenty-five years, and
it is imprudent to assume that Russian policy will continue to be so generous as
to ignore these Western vulnerabilities ad infinitum.
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